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Appeal No. 20080921-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
—000O000— 
HARRY MILLER, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellee. : 
—000O000— 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. allows dismissals only when Plaintiff has failed to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has met the basic requirements 
of the statue governing these actions, Utah Code Ann., § 78B-9-402. Plaintiff has 
asserted that he was factually innocent, based upon evidence that he was not in the 
State of Utah at the time the crime was committed. He has also shown that some of 
the evidence in that regard was obtained after the original trial, and could not have 
been discovered through due diligence prior to trial. Plaintiffs allegations are 
sufficient to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and the dismissal should be 
reversed. 
Pursuant to Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 364 (Utah 1995), the 
standard or review in this matter is that the factual allegations are accepted as true, 
and all reasonable inferences are drawn from them in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiff. The propriety of such a dismissal is a question of law, and is reviewed for 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court. This i ssue was 
preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Opposition 
to that Motions (R 64-65; 70-134;135-158). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT 
ISSUE 
The relevant portions of the Utah Code and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 
included in an Addendum hereto including: 
Utah Code Ann., § 78B-9-401, et seq., the Postconviction Determination of Factual 
Innocence. 
Rule 12(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake City Department, Salt Lake County, granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
for failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. This is an 
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78B-9-402 seeking compensation for 
imprisonment, due to actual innocence. Plaintiff was previously convicted of 
aggravated robbery, pursuant to Utah code Ann. § 76-3-302, a first degree felony. 
That conviction was reversed; and all charges were dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References herein are to the Record of this Case, No. 080907781 (R.), and to the 
Record of the previous criminal case, No. 031901163FS (R2.) 
Petitioner was arrested on February 11, 2003; and was charged in the Third 
District Court with the crime of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, on or about 
February 18, 2003, in Case No. 031901163FS. (R2. 1-6). He was remanded to the 
custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff on that date. The Information alleged that the 
crime was committed in Salt Lake County on or about December 8, 2000. (R2. 3). 
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Petitioner was tried by jury on the felony charge of aggravated robbery on 
December 16, 2003 (R2. 35-36). At trial, Defendant claimed an alibi defense, but 
was the only witness to that fact. He testified that he had previously lived in Utah; 
but lived in Donaldsonville, LA at the time of the crime, and had been living there 
since 1999. He testified that he had had a stroke in late November, 2000, and had 
to take some time off work. (R2 162-163). The parties entered into a written 
stipulation, to be read at trial, that Mr. Miller had been admitted to the River West 
Medical Center in Louisiana on November 25,2000 for a "cerebrovascular accident" 
(a stroke). He was employed by Ten M Corp in Donaldsonville, LA. from May 2000 
until February, 2002, and had taken medical leave from November 25 until December 
13, 2000. (R2. 40). He also testified that he returned to Utah, where he had lived 
from 1989 to 1999, in February, 2002. 
Petitioner was convicted; and on February 9,2004, he was sentenced to a term 
in the Utah State Prison of from five years to life (R2 135-139). Mr. Miller was 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, or the Salt Lake County jail, from February 
2004 until his release on July 6, 2007, when the Court dismissed all charges against 
him, on the Motion of the Salt Lake District Attorney. 
Petitioner appealed his conviction to this Court under Case No. 20040150(R2. 
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156). On February 7, 2005, his appellate counsel filed a Motion to Remand the 
matter to the District Court to enter findings concerning Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. His appellate counsel argued that other alibi 
witnesses could have, and should have, been obtained, including Defendant's niece, 
Berthella Miller, who would testify that Defendant was living with her and 
Defendant's sister, after the stroke, and that she saw him daily during this period of 
time. (R2. 160-168). Berthella filed an affidavit with the Court to this effect. (R2. 
211-212). Also, Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who provided home care to 
Defendant, filed an affidavit with the Court in support of the Motion. That affidavit 
stated that she visited Mr. Miller in Donaldsonville on December 7, 2000 and again 
on December 14,2000. An assessment produced by the nurse on December 14,2000, 
included the statement: "Able to ride in a car only when driven by another person OR 
able to use a bus or handicap van only when assisted or accompanied by another 
person." (R2 172-186). Neither had been contacted by Defendant's trial attorney. 
Defendant's sister, Paula Miller, was contacted by Defense counsel prior to the 
trial, but she was unwilling to come to trial, because of other family problems in 
Louisiana. She filed an affidavit with the Court that Mr. Miller had lived with her 
after he was released from the hospital on November 28, 2000, and had returned to 
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work on December 13, 2000. She stated that he did not leave the State during that 
time, and that she believed he would not have been physically able to travel long 
distances. (R2.234-236). There were also Court records from Louisiana indicating 
that Defendant had appeared in Court in Ascension Parish Court, State of Louisiana 
on December 5, 2000 for fishing without a license. (R2. 208). 
The victim, on the other hand, was sure that Defendant was the one who robbed 
her, despite the fact that it had been over two years since the robbery, when she 
identified him from a photo line up and an in-person lineup. (R2. 158 p. 65-66; 94). 
She had, however, seen black men she thought might be the robber a few other times, 
but had never been sure (R2. 158 P. 68). Her identification was supported by the 
store clerk at the Stop n' Go outside of which the robbery had occurred, who stated 
that he had seen the Defendant around the store aevery now and then" prior to the 
date of the robbery, and specifically stated that he was able to identify Defendant 
because of his prior contacts with him. (R2. 158 p. 96-97). The sightings, "several 
times", were between July and December, 2000 as he had only started working there 
in July. (R2. 158 p. 98-99). 
See also the narrative report by Sgt. Charles Oliver, of an interview with the 
store clerk who provided the second identification of Mr. Miller, from a photo lineup 
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shown him on October 24, 2003, almost three years after the incident. While the 
clerk picked Mr. Miller out of the photo spread, the report also states: "Mr. Nissan 
states that he knew the black male as a customer who came into the store once in a 
while. He states he did not know his name but just recognized him as a customer."(R. 
151). See also the e-mail exchange between Gretchen Havner and Kent Morgan, 
Assistant Justice Division Director and a man known for his determination to convict 
criminals, only a week or so before the State moved to dismiss the charges: 
Kent Morgan: I am reviewing the file . . . thus far, I see this as only a single 
eyewitness identification case with no corroboration. . .if I find no 
corroborative evidence . . .1 think I will be letting this case go . . .1 have some 
concern that a third person identified your client as a former customer. 
(Emphasis added). 
Gretchen Havner: The reason I believe the store clerk is mistaken about 
Harry's identity is we can show Harry was employed by 10M Corporation in 
Donaldsonville, Louisiana, from the end of May 2000 until February 2002. 
Therefore, he wouldn't have been in Salt Lake City to be a regular customer 
at the store leading up to the date of the incident. (R. 156). 
On or about April 26, 2005, the Court ordered the matter remanded to the 
District Court for additional factual findings regarding the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, pursuant to Rule 23B of the Rules of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The order stated that it was for the purpose of allowing the 
"Third District Court to conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter 
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findings of fact necessary to determine the following claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel". 
On February 1, 2006, the matter was returned to the Court of Appeals, after 
additional facts were determined. No finding was made of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
The appeal was scheduled for oral arguments before this Court on January 22, 
2007. On or about January 18, 2007, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion for 
Summary Reversal; and on the day set for oral arguments, this Court dismissed the 
appeal and remanded the case to this Court for a new trial. 
A retrial was scheduled for July 12, 2007. On July 5, 2007, the Salt Lake 
District Attorney notified the District Court that it would not be going forward to trial 
on the assigned date, and filed a Motion to Dismiss. On July 6, 2007, the trial Court 
signed the Order dismissing all charges, "in the interest of justice". Defendant 
dismissed was released from custody the same day. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner's Petitioner, brought under the recent legislation providing for 
compensation to those unjustly convicted and imprisoned, alleges sufficient facts to 
defeat Defendant's Motion, under Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. to dismiss, based on the 
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failure to State a cause of action. The allegations, if true, show that Defendant is 
highly unlikely to have committed the crime with which he was charged, and of 
which he was previously convicted. 
Further, the trial Court erred in its standard of review. First, it should have 
reviewed the Petition in light of the reversal of the conviction, ad the dismissal of the 
criminal charges. Second, it should not have relied on the factors set out in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 (2)(a), as those requirements do not apply to petitions 
brought under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 (b). The search here should be for 
justice, not for a slavish adherence to form. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASSUMING THE ALLEGATIONS TO BE TRUE, PETITIONER HAS ALLEGED 
ADEQUATE FACTS TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING ON THE QUESTION OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE. 
This is a Petition to determine factual innocence, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-9-401. This Petition is brought pursuant to Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This Petition was filed within one year of the date that retrial was 
scheduled, and upon which this Court ordered all charges dismissed. Further, this 
Petition was filed promptly upon jurisdiction being conferred on the District Court 
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to determine factual innocence, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-401 et seq., 
effective May 5, 2008. In its 2008 general session, the Utah legislature passed Utah 
Code Ann., previously designated as §78-35a-401, et seq. and now recodified as § 
78B-9-401 et seq., entitled "Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence". 
The act provides for the filing of a Petition, similar to that provided for by the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-101, et seq., and subject to the 
provisions of Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as to form and content. 
A Petition is to be filed in the District Court having jurisdiction over the matter, and 
shall request a hearing to determine factual innocence. The Petitioner may allege 
"newly discovered evidence that establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent." 
It should be sufficient, in conjunction with other evidence, to establish factual 
innocence. Petitioner claims that there is substantial new evidence which defense 
counsel did not produce at trial. In the alternative, Petitioner asserts that the 
evidence taken as a whole shows factual innocence, and no other finding is necessary. 
Therefore, Petitioner alleges that this matter should have been set for hearing to 
determine factual innocence. 
The trial Court granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss this action pursuant 
to Rules 12(b)(6) and 65Cofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) allows 
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a Motion to Dismiss based on the failure to State a cause of action. According to the 
Utah Supreme Court, in Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995): 
"A rule 12(b)(6) Motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint 
but challenges the Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." In 
determining whether a trial Court properly granted a Motion to dismiss under 
rule 12(b)(6), we accept the factual allegations as true and consider them and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff. (Internal citations omitted) (Emphasis added). 
At this point, Petitioner does not need to prove factual innocence. He only needs to 
show that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that allegation. The State, on the 
other hand, in order to sustain the dismissal, must show that, even if all the 
allegations are true, there is no reason to have such a hearing, as the allegations are 
insufficient in themselves. The burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing is not now 
important. Certainly, the strong evidence of alibi defense, the poor quality of the eye 
witness identification, and the nonsensical conclusions relied upon to show guilt are 
sufficient to get past Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P. 
Petitioner's appellate attorney, in the closing paragraph of his Reply Brief to 
this Court, on direct appeal, summed up the original conviction: 
Here, the result was so unreliable as to approach the absurd. To propose that 
a man who lived and was gainfully employed in a small Louisiana town would 
- after being disabled by a stroke - somehow travel over 1800 miles without 
any of his caretakers knowing about it, immediately commit a random crime 
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against a stranger with negligible gain, and get himself home without anyone 
noticing his absence defies logic. 
Petitioner has always maintained that he was in the State of Louisiana on the 
day when the crime was committed, and so testified at trial. Prior to the remand, 
additional testimony as to an alibi defense was obtained, which had not been available 
at the original trial. Petitioner claims factual innocence by virtue of his alibi defense, 
and the high degree of certainty that he was not present at the time and place the 
offense was committed. Mr. Miller would have had to fly to Utah on December 7th, 
almost immediately after his nursing appointment, commit the crime, and return to 
Louisiana shortly thereafter. The nurse's comments show that he was not in physical 
shape to do so. No evidence has been produced whatsoever that such a trip was 
made. While some suggestion has been made that he came out to see his brother, his 
brother gave a statement to the police indicating that he had seen the Defendant for 
some time. His caretakers did not notice his absence; and given the tight timeline, 
such a visit makes little sense. 
The previous remand to the District Court was not to determine innocence, but 
instead to determine whether trial counsel met the minimum standard necessary to 
fulfill his legal duty to defend the Defendant in court. This Court's remand order , 
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however, also included the instruction: "If trial counsel's performance is found to be 
deficient, the prejudicial effect, if any, of the deficient performance on the outcome 
of the trial." (R2. 253). In addressing that issue, the trial Court did review certain 
newly discovered facts that had not been introduced as evidence at trial. The most 
important items of evidence were the the testimony of Berthella Miller, Defendant's 
niece; and the affidavits of Beverly Kolder, a home health care nurse assigned to 
assist Mr. Miller while he recuperated from a stroke suffered in late November. 
There were also affidavits submitted by Melissa Landry, the interim director of River 
West Home Care, as to the dates of care provided by the agency, and Defendant's 
sister, Paula Miller. 
Berthella Miller testified personally that she had seen him every day during 
the three weeks he was out of work due to his illness. The Court found that there were 
many factors involved in counsel's inability to obtain all the witnesses and 
information needed to present the alibi defense. He had incomplete information about 
the home health care agency. He was able to contact Defendant's sister, Paula, but 
he was unable to convince her, because of other family problems, to come to Utah to 
testify. He was not told of Berthella, the niece, and did not get in touch with her. He 
reasonably believed that the alibi case was strong , based on the stipulation and the 
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testimony of Mr. Miller. (R2. 596-609). The Court made the following findings 
about the witnesses who had not been called by defense counsel at trial: 
53. Berthella made inconsistent statements and had a poor memory of 
defendant's stroke. The Court therefore finds that her testimony was, at 
best, not reliable and that she would not have been a credible witness at 
Defendant's trial. 
58. Evidence from the home health care nurse concerning the dates of her 
visits to defendant would have narrowed the window of time that 
defendant could have been gone from Louisiana, but would not have 
provided an alibi for the date of the crime on December 8, 2000 
59. Evidence from the home health care nurse fails to establish a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome at trial. 
60. Because of her inconsistent statements and lack of memory about crucial 
information, testimony from Berthella Miller at the evidentiary hearing 
was not credible. If her testimony had been presented at trial, it would 
have been weighed against all of the other facts, testimony, and evidence 
presented at trial, including the credible testimony of the victim and the 
second eye-witness. 
61. Testimony from Berthella Miller fails to establish a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome at trial. (R2. 606-607). 
The affidavit of Ms. Kolder firmly placed Mr. Miller in Donaldsonville, Louisiana the 
day before the robbery, the visit having concluded at 11:02 AM on that day. The 
Court responded that "Defendant could have traveled by airplane from Louisiana to 
Utah on December 7, 2005 [should be 2000]". (R2. 600). While that is true, of 
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course, it should be rather obvious that the scenario is highly unlikely. Mr. Miller 
does not travel by plane. Even though members of the UACDL and others 
contributed to a fund to help him get back to Louisiana after he was released, he 
never considered a plane, but instead took the bus. The State's brief, filed in the 
Court of Appeals, referred to the period of time that Mr. Miller was out of work from 
November 28 through December 13 to recuperate from the stroke, and suggested that 
"this time gap allowed Defendant time to travel to Salt Lake City to visit his brother, 
commit the robbery, and return to Louisiana." (P. 8)(Emphasis added). The logistics 
of getting to Salt Lake City in time to commit this crime make it nearly impossible. 
If Mr. Miller had driven, it would have taken over 27 hours, something not possible 
to do in time, even assuming he could physically have made such a trip. If he had 
flown, he would have to have driven to New Orleans, a trip of about one and a half 
hours, gotten on a plane, paid extra to fly direct, and POSSIBLY made it in eight 
hours. For what purpose, to rob somebody of a few dollars and then fly back in time 
to go back to work, and for his next home nursing visit? Nobody has ever attempted 
to plot out what planes he would have taken, and whether the planes actually did 
arrive on time. 
The trial Court found that trial counsel there was not deficient regarding the 
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home health care nurse, "because defendant failed to provide him with information 
to locate this witness, and because evidence from this witness does not establish an 
alibi for the date of the crime." Regarding the testimony of Petitioner's niece, there 
was no deficiency "because counsel was unaware that Berthella had any relevant 
information, defendant failed to tell him that Berthella might have been a helpful 
witness, and defendant failed to provide him with information to locate this witness." 
The Court went on to state that, even assuming that the two witnesses had testified, 
"there is no reasonable probability of a different result" at trial, due most importantly 
to "the credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial." (R2. 608-609). 
In making its previous findings, the Court made its own determination of the 
credibility of the witnesses and potential witnesses. The Court, in particular, 
discounted the testimony of Bethella Miller, as her memory was not sharp, and details 
were lacking. This is not surprising, in light of the fact that the incident at issue was 
then over five years old. The State, in its Motion below, also points out that 
Petitioner's evidence "must be weighed against the State's two credible eyewitnesses 
who have repeatedly identified petitioner as the robber." (R. 77). The Court appears 
to have relied upon its previous findings, in its ruling here granting the Motion to 
Dismiss. So, both the Court and the State were in error, in relying on assertions of 
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credibility. For purposes of a Motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Credibility is not at issue; 
nor is the relative weight of the "State's two credible eyewitnesses". See again 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995): "In determining whether 
a trial Court properly granted a Motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), we accept the 
factual allegations as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff." 
In referring to those "credible" witnesses, the State seems to be taking the 
position that their testimony has some strong weight, because it was sufficient to 
convict, before that conviction was overturned. When reviewed in conjunction with 
later discovered evidence, that evidence, given some three years after the robbery, is 
NOT all that credible. By the time the date set for retrial approached, it appears that 
the corroborating testimony of Mr. Nissen had been totally discredited. The case was 
weakened to the point that the charges were dropped. It is disingenuous at this point 
to make the claim that the State's case is so strong that no hearing on innocence 
should even be held. 
POINT II 
THE LAW SHOULD BE READ TO GIVE EVERY CHANCE TO AN INNOCENT 
PERSON TO BE COMPENSATED FOR UNJUSTIFIED IMPRISONMENT. 
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Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to "Postconviction 
relief" It was promulgated before the Postconviction Determination of Innocence 
Act was passed, and does not contemplate its use here. However, the Rule does 
prescribe the procedure for a Petition, which states the grounds for relief and the 
allegations that need to be made. The Rule is designed for someone who is 
attempting to remove a conviction which is still on the record. It does not speak to 
the situation where there is no conviction. Nevertheless, the procedures of the Rule 
have been followed, including the Petition, the attachments and the supporting 
memorandum. The rule allows for summary dismissal of the Petition, if the Petition 
is frivolous on its face, or if it does not support a claim for relief, as a matter of law. 
In this regard, it tracks Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P., but does not add to it. This Petition 
is not frivolous; and it does not fail to State a cause of action as a matter of law. The 
allegations are sufficient, if believed, to show that the Petitioner is factually innocent. 
Thus, the petition is sufficient under the rule. 
This is the very first case brought under the new law. This new law, which 
allows for compensation to someone who has been imprisoned for something he did 
not do, is in the same chapter of the code as the Post Conviction Remedies Act. It 
reflects some of the same policy considerations, and contains some of the same 
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limitations. But there is a fundamental difference in the proceedings, which the State 
and the trial Court did not acknowledge. The Post Conviction Remedies Act will 
only be used by someone who has been finally convicted of a crime and is seeking 
relief from that conviction. Because that person has already had a constitutional right 
to an appeal (Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, § 5) the right to bring post-conviction 
proceedings is limited to situations where the appeal did not vindicate the right of the 
criminal Defendant to due process of law. Such a case would not be brought if the 
appeal were successful. Therefore, the requirements include that there be new 
evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence have been discovered in time to 
be included in post trial motions, and the appellate process. An exception is made 
when counsel for Defendant in the underlying criminal proceedings was found to be 
ineffective. While there was a claim made on Petitioner's direct appeal that trial 
counsel was ineffective, and while that claim was not upheld, the appeal was 
successful. Counsel for the State downplays that fact in saying: 
Although both parties agreed that there was "an error in the trial proceedings" 
and petitioner's conviction was accordingly reversed, the nature of the error is 
not stated and therefore this unspecified error cannot be the basis for ordering 
a hearing for factual innocence. (R.78-79). (Emphasis added). 
It once again approaches the absurd to read this statute not to favor compensation 
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where the conviction has been reversed on appeal, and the case has been dismissed. 
We now know that Mr. Miller was incarcerated for something of which he is 
presumed innocent. The law should not be read to prevent his compensation under 
these circumstances. 
The State opened its memorandum below with a recitation of the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a). Those include that there is new evidence, that 
the evidence is not merely cumulative of what was known at the time of trial, and that 
the evidence shows that Defendant is factually innocent. Part of the statute referred 
to by the State reads: 
(vi)(A) neither the petitioner nor the petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence 
at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial Motion or post conviction motion, and the evidence 
could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
However, the new law (Utah Code Ann § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(A))allows the Court 
to waive the necessity of either showing that the evidence could not have been known 
at trial, or that counsel was ineffective, in the interest of justice. On the face of it, a 
person who has had his conviction reversed seems to have no advantage over the 
person who filed this Petition from his prison cell; but that does not make sense. The 
act mimics the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act", in requiring, in § 78B-9-402((2)(a) 
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that "the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes 
innocence". But, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)((b): 
A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or 
reversed the person's conviction may also file a petition under this part if no 
retrial or appeal regarding this offense is pending. (Emphasis added). 
Petitioner contends that this language does, in fact, grant some advantage to the 
person who no longer has a conviction. He may "also file a petition"; but he is not 
specifically restrained by the language of § 78B-9-402((2)(a). This is a separate and 
distinct part of the statute, which can stand on its own without any reference to 
subparagraph (a). Why should the Petitioner here be required to show that the 
information regarding innocence was unknown to him or his counsel at the original 
trial, if the results of that trial did not stand? If he had gone to retrial, could he not 
have introduced all available evidence of his innocence, regardless of when and how 
it was discovered? What interest does the State now have in defending the result of 
the original trial, which has now been discredited? The purpose of this statute is to 
compensate the person who has been unjustly punished for something it now appears 
he did not do. Further, the statute, in requiring proof of actual innocence, prevents 
compensation to someone who has prevailed because evidence of his guilt has been 
suppressed as wrongfully seized. But this is not such a case. Here, after trial, the 
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evidence of innocence continued to build until the State agreed to a summary reversal 
of the guilty verdict, not based on a "technicality", but because it no longer appeared 
that the evidence, taken as a whole, could support the verdict. Then, the State took 
the additional step of moving to dismiss the charges and release the Defendant from 
jail,"in the interest of justice". And all of this occurred after the trial Judge had found 
the evidence insufficient to support the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The same trial Judge rejected the cumulative evidence of innocence in the context of 
this Petition, based on her previous decision, which, the parties have stipulated, 
stopped short of doing justice. The trial Judge reviewed this Petition using the 
wrong standard. The petition, having been filed after the momentous events 
involving the dismissal, deserved and required a truly de novo review. What it 
received was an improper deference to a previously discredited ruling: "the Court 
reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court of appeals and determined 
that there was 4no reasonable probability of a different result even if [the new 
witnesses] had testified.'" (R. 172). 
Petitioner contends that the State and the trial Court erred in their contention 
that this statute should be limited in its relief to the trial which resulted in the 
conviction. In the end, the State refused to take this case to retrial, based on newly 
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discovered weaknesses in the evidence, These facts do not now stand as having been 
proved. The conviction was reversed, based on the serious questions raised by newly 
discovered facts. The "credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial" was 
seriously questioned by both sides in this litigation. Contrary to the State's assertions 
here, there is now a very strong presumption of innocence. The State very rarely 
concedes that a trial reached such an unfair result that it must be summarily reversed. 
The State now contends that nothing can be read into that stipulation. This was a 
very serious move, and a great deal must be read into it. The trial Court erred 
seriously in assuming that the case was in a similar posture on this petition to where 
it was on the remand from this Court. At that time, the trial Court looked at the case 
with the knowledge of a conviction, and determined whether there were obvious 
mistakes which were serious enough to set aside the conviction. On this Petition, the 
Court should have looked at the case with the knowledge that it had been wrong the 
first time. There were, in fact, errors serious enough to justify reversal. The State 
should get no comfort or support in the claim that no one can know what those errors 
were. We have seen them; and they have justified reversal. The State now asks this 
Court to affirm the trial Court's error in failing to understand the completely new 
posture of this case.. It still may be true that Defendant could conceivably have 
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gotten on an airplane, come out to Utah, and robbed a stranger for a few dollars, 
nowhere near enough to pay for the airplane ticket; but at this point, everyone must 
concede that this does not make sense. 
The ruling of the trial Court, by the Judge who presided over the trial, and also 
reviewed the record for evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, is harsh and 
illogical in its conclusions: 
First, it is apparent from the record that Petitioner cannot meet either 
subsection (vi)(A) or (vi)(B). Specifically, Petitioner was aware of the 
substance of this evidence at the time of trial and it was all presented to his 
appellate counsel for purposes of making ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims on appeal Additionally, the Court found that trial counsel was not 
ineffective. Although the Court could waive either or both of these 
requirements in the interest of justice, the Court finds that Petitioner has not 
met other prongs of 78B-9-402. (Emphasis in original). 
Petitioner has not shown that the evidence, upon which he seeks to rely, is not 
cumulative of evidence presented at trial. Petitioner presented his alibi defense 
at trial. These additional witnesses would have served only to bolster his 
testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion. (R. 172). 
As pointed out above, Petitioner should not have to comply with those subsections, 
as those only apply to someone who still has a conviction. The Court notes that she 
reviewed the new evidence upon remand from the Court of Appeals, and found 
counsel not to have been ineffective; and she ends the inquiry there. She reviewed 
the evidence and made the decision that a reasonable jury would likely have 
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convicted anyway, even if they had known of the new evidence that was now before 
her. She applied the "harmless error" rule, that an error committed which would not 
likely have changed the outcome, does not justify a reversal. See State v. Adams, 
2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642 (Ut 2000). But she ignored the fact, that these facts clearly 
did justify a reversal. 
Under the circumstances, the State was simply wrong in its assertion below 
that "should a hearing be granted, the burden of proof as to petitioner's factual 
innocence does not lie with the State." (R. 77). The State must indeed bear some 
burden to overcome the presumption of innocence. The State, lamely pointed out that 
"this Court has already found that petitioner 'could have traveled by airplane from 
Louisiana in December 7, 2005 [again, should be 2000]." (Emphasis added). In 
another place in its memorandum, the State made the point with even less force: "it 
still remains possible for petitioner to have committed the crime". (Emphasis added) 
(R. 76). The State then made this giant leap of faith: "The State respectfully submits 
that no bona fide issue exists in this case as to whether the petitioner is factually 
innocent". The State did not even try to prove the case against Defendant, after its 
original case had unraveled. Therefore, there really is "no bona fide issue" as to 
Petitioner's innocence. 
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Near the end of its memorandum: "The State maintains that there is no 
compelling interest of justice that requires that a factual innocence hearing now be 
granted to petitioner in this case." (R. 78). That statement conveys total indifference 
as to whether an innocent man has been unjustly punished, and punished severely. 
The Court of Appeals, in State v. Todd. 2007 UT App 349, 173 P.3d 170 (Utah App. 
2007) explained the role of the prosecuting attorney in criminal cases: 
In our judicial system, "the prosecution's responsibility is that of a "minister 
of justice and not simply that of an advocate", which includes a duty "to see 
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon 
the basis of sufficient evidence.5" f 17. (Internal citations omitted). 
The State's position is that a petitioner, who was imprisoned for over four years for 
a crime that has been dismissed for lack of evidence, does not have a claim which 
arises to the level of the "compelling interest of justice". The State's attorneys are 
abdicating their responsibility as "ministers of justice". The United States Supreme 
Court recently expanded the requirement that counsel be furnished to a criminal 
Defendant at the very beginning of the criminal proceeding, in order to avoid a 
miscarriage of justice. In the case of Rothgery v. Gillespie County. Case No. 07-440 
(June 23, 2008), the Court reinstated a civil lawsuit for denial of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, in a case involving an erroneous arrest. Defendant there 
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was arrested and jailed for a period of time as a felon in possession of a firearm. 
Counsel was not immediately appointed to represent him. When counsel was 
appointed, it was determined that the arrest was as a result of a faulty computer entry 
regarding the former felony. Clearly the Supreme Court, seeing that this innocent 
man was jailed without a fair chance to show his innocence, found this to be a case 
of a "compelling interest of justice". 
In light of all this, the conclusion of the trial Court is nothing less than chilling 
in its failure to recognize the importance of the underlying search for justice: 
Finally Petitioner cannot show that this evidence would "establish" that he was 
innocent. Although the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed 
the crime, the Court reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court 
of appeals and determined that there was "no reasonable probability of a 
different outcome at trial if [the new witnesses] had testified." (Emphasis 
added). (R. 172). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-405 provides that, upon a finding of factual 
innocence, the Petitioner shall be paid a sum equal to "the monetary equivalent of the 
average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, as determined by the data most 
recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at the time of the 
petitioner's release from prison" for the time he spent incarcerated in this matter. 
Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing without a preconceived determination. 
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Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to compensation, and requests that this amount be 
determined, after the finding of factual innocence. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is before this Court on review of the dismissal of Petioner's Petition 
under Rule 12(b)(6) U.R.C.P., which allows a dismissal for failure to State a cause 
of action upon which relief may be granted. Petitioners' Petition does, in fact allege 
sufficient facts to require an evidentiary hearing on innocence, and to defeat such a 
Motion. The dismissal should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to the 
District Court for an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED th i s^ l l day of January, 2009. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, LX.C. 
M 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
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This part is known as "Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence." 
78B-9-402. Petition for determination of factual innocence — Sufficient allegations 
— Notification of victim. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Factually innocent" means a person did not: 
(a) engage in the conduct for which the person was convicted; 
(b) engage in conduct relating to any lesser included offenses; or 
(c) commit any other felony arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts 
supporting the indictment or information upon which the person was convicted. 
(2) (a) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district 
court in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is 
factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the person was convicted, if the person asserts 
factual innocence under oath and the petition alleges: 
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes that the petitioner is 
factually innocent; 
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes 
innocence; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that 
the petitioner is factually innocent; and 
(vi) (A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of 
trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or 
postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the 
petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable 
diligence in uncovering the evidence; or 
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) or (2)(a)(vi)(B) in the 
interest of justice. 
(b) A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed the 
person's conviction may also file a petition under this part if no retrial or appeal regarding this 
offense is pending. 
(3) If some or all of the evidence alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence subject 
to DNA testing, the petitioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to Section 78B-9-301. 
(4) The petition shall be in compliance with Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and shall include the underlying criminal case number. 
(5) After a petition is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and 
crime laboratory personnel shall cooperate in preserving evidence and in determining the 
sufficiency of the chain of custody of the evidence which is the subject of the petition. 
(6) (a) A person who files a petition under this section shall serve notice of the petition 
and a copy of the petition upon the office of the prosecutor who obtained the conviction and upon 
the Utah attorney general. The attorney general shall, within 30 days after receipt of service of 
the notice, or within any additional period of time the court allows, answer or otherwise respond 
to all proceedings initiated under this part. 
(b) (i) After the time for response by the attorney general under Subsection (6)(a) has 
passed, the court shall order a hearing if it finds there is a bona fide issue as to whether the 
petitioner is factually innocent of the charges of which the petitioner was convicted. 
(ii) If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually 
innocent, the court may find the petitioner is factually innocent without holding a hearing. 
(7) The court may not grant a petition for a hearing under this part during the period in 
which criminal proceedings in the matter are pending before any trial or appellate court, unless 
stipulated to by the parties. 
(8) Any victim of a crime that is the subject of a petition under this part, and who has 
elected to receive notice under Section 77-38-3, shall be notified by the state's attorney of any 
hearing regarding the petition. 
78B-9-403. Requests for appointment of counsel — Appeals — Postconviction 
petitions. 
(1) Subsections 78B-9-109(1) and (2), regarding the appointment of pro bono counsel, 
apply to any request for the appointment of counsel under this part. 
(2) Subsection 78B-9-109(3), regarding effectiveness of counsel, applies to subsequent 
postconviction petitions and to appeals under this part. 
78B-9-404. Hearing upon petition — Procedures — Court determination of factual 
innocence. 
(1) (a) In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall represent 
the state. 
(b) The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
(2) The court may consider: 
(a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and 
(b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay in evaluating its 
weight and credibility. 
(3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to the evidence 
presented at the hearing under this part, all the evidence presented at the original trial and at any 
postconviction proceedings in the case. 
(4) If the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing 
evidence that the petitioner: 
(a) is factually innocent of one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, 
the court shall order that those convictions: 
(i) be vacated with prejudice; and 
(ii) be expunged from the petitioner's record; or 
(b) did not commit one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, but the 
court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not commit any lesser 
included offenses relating to those offenses, the court shall modify the original conviction and 
sentence of the petitioner as appropriate for the lesser included offense, whether or not the lesser 
included offense was originally submitted to the trier of fact. 
(5) (a) If the court, after considering all the evidence, does not determine by clear and 
convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the offense or offenses the 
petitioner is challenging and does not find that Subsection (4)(b) applies, the court shall deny the 
petition regarding the offense or offenses. 
(b) If the court finds that the petition was brought in bad faith, it shall enter the finding 
on the record, and the petitioner may not file a second or successive petition under this section 
without first applying to and obtaining permission from the court which denied the prior petition. 
78B-9-405. Judgment and assistance payment. 
(1) (a) If a court finds a petitioner factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
Postconviction DNA Testing, or under this part, and if the petitioner has served a period of 
incarceration, the court shall order that, as provided in Subsection (2), the petitioner shall receive 
for each year or portion of a year the petitioner was incarcerated, up to a maximum of 15 years, 
the monetary equivalent of the average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, as 
determined by the data most recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at the 
time of the petitioner's release from prison. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (1), "petitioner" means a United States citizen or an 
individual who was otherwise lawfully present in this country at the time of the incident that gave 
rise to the underlying conviction. 
(2) Payments pursuant to this section shall be made as follows: 
(a) The Office of Crime Victim Reparations shall pay from the Crime Victim 
Reparations Fund to the petitioner within 45 days of the court order under Subsection (1) an 
initial sum equal to either 20% of the total financial assistance payment as determined under 
Subsection (1) or an amount equal to two years of incarceration, whichever is greater, but not to 
exceed the total amount owed. 
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate as nonlapsing funds from the General Fund, and no 
later than the next general session following the issuance of the court order under Subsection (1): 
(i) to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund, the amount that was paid out of the fund under 
Subsection (2)(a); and 
(ii) to the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, as a separate line item, the 
amount ordered by the court for payments under Subsection (1), minus the amount reimbursed to 
the Crime Victim Reparations Fund under Subsection (2)(b)(i). 
(c) Payments to the petitioner under this section, other than the payment under 
Subsection (2)(a), shall be made by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice quarterly 
on or before the last day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period. 
(d) Payments under Subsection (2)(c) shall: 
(i) commence no later than one year after the effective date of the appropriation for the 
payments; 
(ii) be made to the petitioner for the balance of the amount ordered by the court after the 
initial payment under Subsection (2)(a); and 
(iii) be allocated so that the entire amount due to the petitioner under this section has 
been paid no later than ten years after the effective date of the appropriation made under 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(3) (a) Payments pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the extent that the period of 
incarceration for which the petitioner seeks payment was attributable to a separate and lawful 
conviction. 
(b) (i) Payments pursuant to this section shall be tolled upon the commencement of any 
period of incarceration due to the petitioner's subsequent conviction of a felony and shall resume 
upon the conclusion of that period of incarceration. 
(ii) As used in this section, "felony" means a criminal offense classified as a felony under 
Title 76, Chapter 3, Punishments, or conduct that would constitute a felony if committed in Utah. 
(c) The reduction of payments pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) or the tolling of payments 
pursuant to Subsection (3)(b) shall be determined by the same court that finds a petitioner to be 
factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part. 
(4) (a) A person is ineligible for any payments under this part if the person was already 
serving a prison sentence in another jurisdiction at the time of the conviction of the crime for 
which that person has been found factually innocent pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part, and that person is to be returned to that other 
jurisdiction upon release for further incarceration on the prior conviction. 
(b) Ineligibility for any payments pursuant to this Subsection (4) shall be determined by 
the same court that finds a person to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part. 
(5) Payments pursuant to this section: 
(a) are not subject to any Utah state taxes; and 
(b) may not be offset by any expenses incurred by the state or any political subdivision of 
the state, including expenses incurred to secure the petitioner's custody, or to feed, clothe, or 
provide medical services for the petitioner. 
(6) If a court finds a petitioner to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 
3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part, the court shall also: 
(a) issue an order of expungement of the petitioner's criminal record for all acts in the 
charging document upon which the payment under this part is based; and 
(b) provide a letter to the petitioner explaining that the petitioner's conviction has been 
vacated on the grounds of factual innocence and indicating that the petitioner did not commit the 
crime or crimes for which the petitioner was convicted and was later found to be factually 
innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part. 
(7) A petitioner found to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part shall have access to the same services and programs 
available to Utah citizens generally as though the conviction for which the petitioner was found 
to be factually innocent had never occurred. 
(8) Payments pursuant to this part constitute a full and conclusive resolution of the 
petitioner's claims on the specific issue of factual innocence. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the 
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after 
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party 
served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within 
twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in 
the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered 
by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order 
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of 
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion 
directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for 
responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on 
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of 
the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at 
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting 
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the 
hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be 
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the 
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the 
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within 
such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the 
motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may 
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party 
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and 
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party 
shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so 
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection 
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in 
the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the 
denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of 
such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action 
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a 
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may 
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of 
the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a 
$300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs 
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be 
required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking 
as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion 
of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed 
under Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition 
with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was 
entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a 
change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may 
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in 
relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of 
the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good 
cause shown. The petition shall state: 
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the 
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case 
number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim 
to relief; 
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of 
probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate 
proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal; 
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those 
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; and 
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the 
reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be 
addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to 
the petition: 
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct 
appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil 
proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
l o f 4 1/19/2009 3:19 PN 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two 
copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to 
the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not 
available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. 
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it 
is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any 
claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order 
dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is 
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in 
the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(g)(2)(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(g)(2)(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to 
the filing of the petition. 
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure 
to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with 
leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for 
good cause shown. 
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in 
a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of 
the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the 
petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments 
and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony 
conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney 
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the 
petitioner. 
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for 
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such 
other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond 
to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other 
response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed 
for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the 
petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments 
will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a 
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hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, 
but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of 
the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may: 
(j)(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(j)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(j)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented 
at the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing 
conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be 
conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court 
during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the 
petitioner is confined. 
(I) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court 
upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery 
is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; stay. 
(m)(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a 
felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent 
shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new 
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the 
order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, 
the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the 
order to release the petitioner. 
(m)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the 
trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, 
bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), 
to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs 
to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the 
custody of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the 
manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for 
fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes 
governing appeals to those courts. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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Judge Shell* 
Date: September 26, 2008 n . R *"* C ^ ^ 
This matter is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the 
memoranda, the Court finds that the Motion should be GRANTED. 
Petitioner seeks a determination that he was actually innocent of the charges against him, which were 
ultimately dismissed. Actual innocence hearings are governed by Utah Code Annotated §78B-9-402 which 
provides: 
(2) (a) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district court 
in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is 
factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the person was convicted, if the person 
asserts factual innocence under oath and the petition alleges: 
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes that the petitioner is 
factually innocent; 
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes 
innocence; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
that the petitioner is factually innocent; and 
(vi) (A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence could not 
have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the 
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exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise 
reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence; or 
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) or 
(2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest of justice. 
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that the following new evidence exists which establishes that he is factually 
innocent. (1) the Affidavit of Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who provided Petitioner home health care 
in Louisiana on December 7, 2000 and December 14, 2000 and (2) the Affidavit of Berthella Miller. The 
Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required showing for a hearing. 
First, it is apparent from the record that Petitioner cannot meet either subsection (vi)(A) or (vi)(B). 
Specifically, Petitioner was aware of the substance of this evidence at the time of trial and it was all 
presented to his appellate counsel for purposes of making ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal. 
Additionally, the Court found that trial counsel was not ineffective. Although the Court could waive either 
or both of these requirements in the interest of justice, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met other 
prongs of Section 78B-9-402. 
Petitioner has not shown that the evidence, upon which he seeks to rely, is not cumulative of 
evidence presented at trial. Petitioner presented his alibi defense at trial. These additional witness would 
have served only to bolster his testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion. 
Finally, Petitioner cannot show that this evidence would "establish" that he was innocent. Although 
the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed the crime, the Court reviewed this evidence as part 
of a remand from the court of appeals and determined that there was "no reasonable probability of a different 
outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified." 
For the foregoing reasons, the State's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This Ruling and Order shall 
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serve as the final order on this matter. No further order need be prepared by the 
,4s 
DATED thisjg day of September, 2008. 
Judge Sheila K. McC\ 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a copy of the Minute Entry was sent to the following, by the following 
method on the 30th day of September, 2008 
Method Name 
Mail: W. Andrew Mccullough 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
6885 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Scott W. Reed 
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5272 South College Drive 
Suite 200, Murray, Ut 84123 
Dated this the 30th day of September, 2008 
jeputy Court Qlerk 
